# E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS

# Recent guidelines of the European antitrust authority

# ANDEC Law Seminar hosted by Confcommercio Milan

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# E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Recent guidelines of the European antitrust authority TOPICS 1 - E-commerce sector inquiry 2 - Critical aspects identified (a): selective distribution networks and obligation to have at least one brick and mortar shop 3 - Critical aspects identified (b): main vertical restrictions set out in agreements between supplier and retailer 4 - Commission's conclusions 5 - Investigations by antitrust authorities during 2017 and concluding remarks






- 1. On 6 May 2015, the EU Commission launched an **e-commerce sector inquiry which** was completed on 10 May 2017 with the publication of its *Final Report*
- 2. The inquiry takes its cue from the 'Digital Single Market Strategy' document of the European Union whose essential purpose is, according to the Commission, to " ...make the EU's single market fit for the digital age – tearing down regulatory walls and moving from 28 national markets to a single one. This could contribute €415 billion per year to our economy and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs".
- **3**. The inquiry focused its attention **on the most sold online products**, namely consumer electronics, home appliances, video games and software, media books, CDs, DVDs and blu-ray discs, clothing and footwear, cosmetics and health products, sports and leisure equipment, home and gardening articles.





**4**. The inquiry takes its cue also from the fact that e-commerce has increasingly spread throughout the EU, where the percentage of e-shoppers among consumers has grown from **30%** in 2007 to **55%** in **2016** 



More specifically, the survey was conducted through questionnaires aimed at:

- (a) obtaining a **comprehensive market overview** and,
- (b) gather **information on obstacles to competition** related to the growth of e-commerce.
- In particular, among all the respondents, *those who replied* were as follows:
- □ <u>1051</u> retailers;
- □ <u>37</u> marketplaces;
- □ <u>89</u> price comparison tool providers;
- □ <u>17</u> payment system providers;
- □ <u>259</u> manufacturers;
- □ <u>248</u> digital content providers;
- **<u>9</u>** companies offering virtual private networks and IP routing services;
- □ <u>30</u> large groups and hosting operators from 28 Member States;

Respondents submitted in total <u>2605</u> agreements related to the distribution of consumer goods and <u>6426</u> licensing agreements related to the distribution of digital content.






#### **Distribution of responding Retailers by Member State:**

	Retailers		Retailers
Belgium	29	Lithuania	16
Bulgaria	13	Luxembourg	5
Czech Republic	13	Hungary	19
Denmark	32	Malta	12
Germany	338	Netherlands	46
Estonia		Austria	24
Ireland	9	Poland	30
Greece	13	Portugal	18
Spain	38	Romania	14
France	48	Slovenia	18
Croatia	6	Slovakia	9
Italy	82	Finland	14
Cyprus	15	Sweden	36
Latvia	11	United Kingdom	132






Distribution of retailers across product categories (number of retailers):








Proportion of responding manufacturers by number of employees:







Distribution of respondent manufacturers in terms of product categories (number of manufacturers)







#### Main results

(1) Increased *price transparency* for consumers, who are now able to obtain and compare online product information and move from one online channel to an offline channel. This can lead to *free-riding* practices, as defined in the Commission's final report of 10 May 2017: "*…consumers can use pre-sales services of brick and mortar shops before purchasing the product online; alternatively, consumers can search and compare products online before purchasing in brick and mortar shops …".* 

**Issue:** without a playing level field between offline and online sales, retailers may not be encouraged to provide quality services.

(2) Increased *price competition* for online and offline sales

**Issue:** the lack of profitability distorts competition and affects other key parameters for the consumer: brand, quality, innovation.





Main results

(3) A greater price transparency allows manufacturers/suppliers to *more easily monitor the prices* applied by retailers by quickly identifying, through software, deviations from their 'recommended' prices.

Issue: possibility of automated price coordination, raising competition concerns.

(4) *Spread of marketplaces* that by their nature allow small retailers to increase their visibility and customers base with limited investments.

**Issue:** conflict with the distributive and trademark strategies of manufacturers.










#### E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Recent guidelines of the European antitrust authority

TOPICS	
1 - E-commerce sector inquiry	
2 - Critical aspects identified (a): selective distribution networks and obligation to have at least one brick and mortar shop	-
3 - Critical aspects identified (b): main vertical restrictions set out in agreements between supplier and retailer	
4 - Commission's conclusions	
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The first relevant conclusion of the e-commerce inquiry refers to selective distribution networks. In fact, as the Commission states, against a backdrop of new online sales trends such as enhanced **price transparency**, greater **price competition**, increased **cross-border sales**, **manufacturers increasingly use selective distribution systems to better control their sales network and recommended prices**.







**Regulation (EU) 330/2010**, in force from 1 June 2010 to 31 May 2022, concerns only the **Vertical agreements between non-competing undertakings** (such as, for example, the agreements between Philips and its distributors and not the 'horizontal' agreements between Philips and Sony, Samsung and/or other competitors).

Exceptionally, some **Vertical agreements between competing undertakings** are also included, among which:

- Vertical agreements concluded within a <u>purchasing group or an association</u> formed by a group of retailers, provided that no retailer has a turnover of more than €50 million per annum (excluding transactions with its affiliates);
- <u>Dual distributions agreements</u> where also the supplier distributes the goods that it sells to another non-competing distributor.





- These agreements benefit from the exemption provided for by the Regulation, despite some content that would normally be forbidden if:
- they do not contain fundamental restrictions on competition and
- the market share held by the seller does not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or services and
- the market share held by the buyer does not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it purchases the contract goods or services.

The 'Relevant Market' must be identified by taking into account two criteria:

- (1) <u>relevant market for the product</u>, consisting of goods and services regarded as interchangeable by the buyer and,
- (2) <u>relevant geographic market</u>, understood as the area where are supplied the relevant services or products characterized by different competitive conditions from those of other areas.





#### Logic for the vertical agreements exemption:

the social economic benefits outweigh the disadvantages. See recital (8):

"It can be presumed that, where the market share held by each of the undertakings party to the agreement on the relevant market does not exceed 30 %, vertical agreements which do not contain certain types of severe restrictions of competition generally lead to an improvement in production or distribution and allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits".





- Examples of clauses normally prohibited <u>but exempted</u> under the Regulation:
- Obligation of the supplier to sell the contract products only to the selected retailers.
- Obligation of the retailer to purchase the contract goods only from the supplier.
- Prohibition for retailers to sell to other retailers NOT belonging to the selective distribution network.
- Prohibition for retailers to actively seek customers outside the contract territory.





- Examples of clauses <u>nonetheless prohibited</u> under the Regulation:
- Restriction of the buyer's ability to <u>determine its sale price</u>, without prejudice to the possibility of imposing a maximum sale price (not minimum) or recommending a sale price.
- Restriction of <u>cross-supplies</u> between distributors part of a selective distribution network.
- Prohibition to sell to <u>end users</u> (except in the case of wholesalers).
- Prohibition to meet unsolicited orders from buyers outside the contract territory.





The Commission considers that for the moment **there is no need to review** the existing Regulation.

The findings highlight a critical issue in relation to the requirement for retailers part of a selective distribution network to operate at least one brick and mortar shop.

In fact, according to the Commission, where such requirement is not intended to ensure the quality of the distribution and/or brand image, it could be prohibited since not justified by the exemption Regulation.

We can therefore reasonably expect a **particular attention on this point from EU and national antitrust authorities**, who will evaluate on a case-by-case basis depending on the situation, whether or not such requirement is justified consistently with the circumstances referred to above.







Figure showing the proportion of retailers by sales channel in 2014:









Figure showing the number of respondent manufacturers that sell via selective distribution and introduced new selection criteria in the last 10 years:








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The Figure below shows *the main vertical restraints* – not necessarily unlawful – revealed by the Commission's final report (the percentages are based on the replies received to the questionnaires):





Pricing restrictions/recommendations: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing

The Italian antitrust law (Law 287/1990, Article 2), as well as EU law (Article 101 TFEU), prohibits, inter alia, any agreements or concerted practices which aim to, or have the de-facto effect of "*directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions*".

By contrast, it is not prohibited for the supplier, not even within a selective distribution network, **suggesting** to his customers the retail selling prices, provided of course that they are free to comply with it or not.

The question arising in the **practical application of this provision** is precisely this: when is a price an actual suggested retail price (legitimate) and when is it instead an imposed price (prohibited)?







**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

Just to give some example, the supplier who threatens to interrupt the commercial relations with retailers that do not apply his 'suggested' prices (thus obtaining compliance through constraint) or offers discounts, bonuses, co-marketing, advantageous prices or other benefits only to those retailers that comply with his suggested prices and not to those that do not apply them, violates this regulatory provision as it dictates a form of agreement with which he imposes to the retailer (or 'maintains') the retail prices.

In the case of selective distribution networks, the exemption Regulation 330/2010 explicitly provides for the possibility of fixing **a maximum selling price** that retailers must apply, but expressly prohibits to set any minimum resale price.



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




ANDEC ABBOCIAZIONE NAZIONALE IMPORTATORI E PRODUTTORI DI ELETTRONICA CIVILE


**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

Now, <u>the first critical issue</u> identified in the Report refers to the frequent use by both manufacturers and retailers of **pricing software to monitor online prices**:



**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

The Figure below refers to the use of automatic price comparison tools in each product category (consumer electronics stand at 11%):





**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

According to the Commission, the use of such tools *could*, on the one hand, allow manufacturers to **monitor retailers** that do not comply with their recommended prices in order to take retaliatory measures against them and, on the other hand, **facilitate collusion between the same retailers** in terms of pricing.

In conclusion, the use of such software <u>is not</u> in itself prohibited, but it may attract the attention of the supervisory authorities and could require specific evidence from the operators involved in order to prove that the use of such tools pursues a legitimate aim and, above all, that it has no adverse effects on competition.







**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

The <u>second critical issue</u> highlighted by the Report refers to '**dual pricing'**, i.e. two different prices applied by the supplier <u>to the same</u> hybrid' retailer (namely to the retailer that sells both online and offline): a price for products intended to be sold online and a different one for products sold through a brick and mortar shop.

This commercial practice is prohibited under the aforementioned exemption Regulation 330/2010, but such prohibition is strongly criticised by manufacturers according to the replies to the questionnaires sent out by the Commission as part of its two-year inquiry. In particular, the manufacturers argue that dual pricing is an effective tool for dealing with *free-riding*, and also that it may help to create a *playing level field between offline and online sales* since it is geared to *level out the difference in the costs of investments* between the two channels.





**Pricing restrictions/recommendations**: (i) online price monitoring software; (ii) dual pricing (continued from previous slide)

The Commission <u>seems</u> to regard such arguments well-founded and concludes that, while dual pricing for the same retailer remains prohibited, **this practice may be exempted on an individual basis, depending on the circumstances of each case and in accordance with the provisions of Article 101(3) TFEU**.







**Restrictions on selling on marketplaces** 

On the basis of the results of the questionnaires sent out to sector operators, the Report shows the **growing importance of sales on marketplaces** with these figures: <u>90%</u> of responding retailers sell online only through their own online shop; <u>31%</u> sell through their online shop as well as on marketplaces; <u>4%</u> sell online only through marketplaces.


As for the **percentage of retailers that sell wholly or partly on marketplaces**, this reaches <u>62%</u> in Germany, <u>43%</u> in the UK and <u>36%</u> in Poland, but it remains low in other countries such as Italy (<u>13%</u>) and Belgium (<u>4%</u>).





**Restrictions on selling on marketplaces** 


Figure showing the percentage of retailers using different sales channels for selling online:






#### **Restrictions on selling on marketplaces**

Figure showing the proportion of retailers in each turnover category that sell on marketplaces:




**Restrictions on selling on marketplaces** 

The Figure below shows the percentage of retailers in each Member State that use marketplaces:



#### **Restrictions on selling on marketplaces**

Agreements between manufacturers and retailers often contain (in 18% of cases according to replies to the questionnaires) **restrictions on the use of marketplaces** that may even include an absolute ban. Such restrictions are generally justified by manufacturers with (i) the need to protect the branded goods and/or (ii) the need to provide suitable pre- and after-sales services.



**Restrictions on selling on marketplaces** 

However, antitrust authorities and courts in some EU countries (especially Germany) **regard with disfavour such restrictions** as, in their opinion, they would have distortive effects on competition since they would:

- (i) (i) tend to exclude or restrict access to the market for smaller retailers and, moreover,
- (ii) undermine the consumers' ability to compare prices.

The **European Court of Justice** is currently dealing with this issue, following a request for preliminary ruling from a German court (Case C-230/16. Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH).





**Restrictions on selling on marketplaces** 

In its Final Report, the Commission concludes that absolute marketplace bans "...are generally compatible with the EU competition rules. The Commission or a national competition authority may decide to withdraw the protection of the exemption regulation in particular cases when justified by the market".

It goes without saying that **the position of the Commission is not binding on the European Court of Justice** and it will therefore be necessary to await the outcome of the proceedings mentioned above, during which, moreover, the Advocate General has already submitted his conclusions, broadly in line with those of the Commission.







# Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

(i) <u>Geo-blocking</u>

The Report indicates three different *geo-blocking* measures with which operators prevent the completion of cross-border sales:

- (1) refusal to deliver goods across borders or accept cross-border payments (which is the system most frequently used);
- (2) blockage of the access to the own website to 'foreign' consumers;
- (3) **automatic re-routing of 'foreign' consumers** to other websites dedicated to other Member States.







# Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

According to replies to the questionnaires, the Report states that:

<u>36%</u> of responding retailers do not sell cross-border for at least one product category they offer;

<u>38%</u> collect information on the location of the consumer in order to implement, where appropriate, geo-blocking measures;

**<u>11%</u>** report to have contractual cross-border sales restrictions.


Despite so, only <u>4%</u> of responding retailers supply all <u>product categories</u> in only one Member State, whereas all others market them in at least **21** Member States.






Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

Figure showing the percentage of retailers that do not sell cross-border in at least one product category:



Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

Figure showing the percentage of retailers that do not sell outside the home Member State for each **product category**:







Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

According to the Commission, such practices are lawful solely and exclusively when they are the result of unilateral decisions by non-dominant undertakings, while they are unlawful pursuant to Article 101 TFEU when they involve a concerted practice between operators, as in the case of a contractual restriction between manufacturer and authorized retailers.

In addition, in the case of a **selective distribution network**, geo-blocking agreements, already prohibited per se, do not fall under the block exemption provided for by Regulation 330/2010 examined above, as, in this case, authorized retailers must still be free to (i) sell to end-users wherever they are located and (ii) meet unsolicited requests for goods from locations outside their contract territory (so-called 'passive sales').







Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers

The Commission refers to **five types of contractual territorial restrictions** on retailers/distributors (sometimes only orally agreed upon) which "*may raise concerns*" as they are, or could be, incompatible with EU competition law and on which the antitrust authorities will presumably be especially vigilant:

- (1) prohibition to <u>actively or passively sell</u> outside the home Member State or to customers located in certain Member States;
- (2) prohibition for authorized retailers to make <u>active sales</u> in areas located outside the home Member State even if such areas have not been allocated to other retailers or reserved to the supplier;
- (3) prohibition to <u>passively sell</u> into territories allocated to other distributors or reserved to the supplier;







Restrictions on cross-border sales: (i) geo-blocking; (ii) various restrictions for authorized retailers (continued from previous slide)

- (4) limitation to the ability of authorized retailers to <u>actively or passively sell</u> to customers located outside their contract territory and Member State in which they operate, but nevertheless part of a selective distribution network extending to several Member States;
- (5) in the case of a selective distribution network operating in several Member States, the appointment in one or more Member States of an exclusive distributor/wholesaler for a certain territory and the <u>imposition of limits on the</u> <u>ability of the distributor to actively sell to others exclusive distributors operating</u> <u>in other Member States</u>.







#### The use of data in e-commerce

The Report highlights an **intense exchange of varied commercial data**, including sensitive data on customers' choices (e.g., on prices and sold quantities), that occurs:

- (i) between **companies operating marketplaces and third parties** (i.e. independent sellers, manufacturers, retailers) or also,
- (ii) between **manufacturers and authorized retailers** who are often burdened with complex reporting requirements, especially in the case of *category management*, of which one key point consists precisely in sharing a significant flow of business information for homogeneous product or service groups between manufacturer and retailer.





#### The use of data in e-commerce

According to the Commission, such an exchange of personal and/or anonymous data **may be largely justified** for a variety of reasons, such as marketing purposes, improving business performance and services to consumers, developing business efficiency.

However, this **may raise competition concerns** due to the fact that both the companies operating marketplaces and the manufacturers also sell at retail level through their own platforms/websites.

This leads to a competitive situation between the entities exchanging data and information, which may result in distortion of competition.







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# 2. E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Conclusions

#### **Commission's conclusions**

The Report ends with the following two conclusions and recommendations of the Commission:

- (1) apply EU competition rules to the commercial practices that have emerged or evolved as a consequence of the growth of e-commerce and highlighted in the Report and,
- (2) **liaise and coordinate with national antitrust authorities** in order to achieve, with reference to e-commerce, a uniform and consistent application of EU competition law.

As for **exemption Regulation 330/2010**, the Commission confirms that its review will not commence until after its expiry in May 2022, as this future review process will have to also take into account the results of the e-commerce sector inquiry.





# 2. E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Conclusions

#### **Commission's conclusions**

The resolve expressed by the Commission is confirmed by **Commissioner Margrethe Vestager**, in charge of competition policy, who in the Report's press release stated the intention to " ...*target the enforcement of EU competition rules in e-commerce markets*".







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# 2. E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Investigations by antitrust authorities during 2017 and concluding remarks

### The initiatives already taken by the Commission during 2017:

- <u>February 2017</u>, the Commission launched three separate investigations concerning price fixing and geo-blocking practices in the field of consumer electronics, video games and hotel industry;
- June 2017, an investigation was launched into the company GUESS (clothing manufacturer and retailer) for allegedly restricting authorized retailers from selling online in other Member States;
- <u>June 2017</u>, an investigation was launched into the companies Nike, Sanrio and Universal Studios, suspected of having **prevented cross-border distance sales** through licensing and commercial practices.

### As for the Italian antitrust authority (AGCM):

- <u>May 2017</u>, AGCM launched an investigation into the company CADEL (stoves) for **imposing minimum selling prices** to online distributors; ;
- July 2017, the investigation was extended to include Zanette and MCZ Groups.







# 2. E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Criticità rilevate: (b) restrizioni verticali nei contratti tra fornitore e dettagliante online

### **Concluding remarks**

Both the Commission and national antitrust authorities seem determined to **strengthen and expand their surveillance activities** in accordance with the results of the recent e-commerce sector inquiry.

This will require businesses to re-assess and update their current sectoral **practices** with renewed and increased attention, focused also on the findings emerging from the Report, in organizing their sales networks, in structuring their online sales and in preparing and drafting all relevant contractual documents.





# Thanks for listening and participating to the seminar!



